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CAN LAWYERS BE CURED?: 
ETERNAL RECURRENCE AND THE 
LACANIAN DEATH DRIVE 
Jeanne L. Schroeder* 
Perhaps Nietzsche's strangest idea is "eternal recurrence." 
Indeed, it is so strange that, despite its centrality in his works,' 
some of Nietzsche's modem interpreters—^most notably 
Alexander Nehamas^—distance themselves from a literal 
interpretation of the doctrine. Rather than a cosmology, it 
becomes a mere thought experiment. This may be necessary if one 
wants to defend Nietzscheanism as a single coherent philosophy.^ 
It does, however, fly in the face of much of Nietzsche's language."* 
I, here, venture no opinion as to the empirical Nietzsche's 
actual behef in the scientific or epistemological status of etemal 
recurrence. I merely offer some thoughts based on Lacanian 
psychoanalysis on both the concept of eternal recurrence as well as 
the reactions of modem day Nietzscheans toward it. I suggest, 
among other things, that eternal recurrence looks forward to 
Lacan's concept of drive: the abandonment of desire, understood 
as the pursuit of a teleological goal, in favor of circular, iterative 
activity. Surprisingly, in psychoanalysis "drive" brings cure—^relief 
from the unbearable pressures of desire. Does this suggest why 
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University, New 
York City. 
' For example, Zarathustra is called "the teacher of the etemal recurrence." 
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA 220 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 
1995) [hereinafter NIETZSCHE, ZARATHUSTRA]. He sings how he lusts after his bride, 
"eternity and after the nuptial ring of rings, the ring of recurrence[.]" Id. at 229. 
2 See infra text at notes 18,19. 
^ See infra text at notes 18,19. 
Consequently, Schacht admits: "1 would argue that several of his presuppositions are 
in fact questionable at best, and that his reasoning is fallacious. I would only contend that 
these passages clearly show him to have been convinced of the truth of the doctrine of 
etemal recurrence and of its demonstrability " RICHARD SCHACHT, MAKING SENSE 
OF NIETZSCHE 45 (1995). 
925 
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eternal recurrence held so much fascination for a man locked in a 
losing battle with psychosis? From this I ask whether the concept 
of eternal recurrence has any relevance to the practice of law. Can 
lawyers be cured? 
This paper proceeds as follows. I start with accounts of 
eternal recurrence and the case for treating it as a thought 
experiment, or theory of human nature, as opposed to a 
cosmology, or theory of nature. I then suggest a few 
interpretations of eternal recurrence drawn from Lacanian theory. 
First, one simplistic interpretation is that the theory of eternal 
recurrence is an example of the mascuhne sexuated position—^an 
attempt to deny the split or negativity that constitutes subjectivity 
that Nietzsche recognizes elsewhere in his work. Second, the 
presumption adopted by some Nietzscheans—^that one can both 
claim to reject a literal interpretation of eternal recurrence while 
simultaneously using it "as though it might be true" for certain 
purposes—^reflects the psychoanalytic strategy known the "fetishist 
split." Third, I offer a more sophisticated interpretation of eternal 
recurrence, comparing it to Lacan's concept of "drive." 
In the final section I turn to an analysis of legal practice based 
on Lacanian discourse theory. I ask whether an attorney can cure 
herself from the unhappiness and resentment caused by desire by 
adopting a theory of eternal recurrence and still engage in the 
practice of law. 
I. ETERNAL RECURRENCE 
A. Truth or Consequences 
Eternal recurrence is the idea that every event in the universe 
necessarily repeats itself exactly an infinite number of times. With 
respect to individuals, this means that our life has already occurred 
and will recur exactly the same way, without deviance, over and 
over and over. 
Nietzsche's most vivid description of eternal recurrence 
appears in The Gay Science. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche 
explains that: 
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you into 
your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now 
live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and 
innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, 
but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and 
everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to 
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retxim to you, all in the same succession and sequence—even 
this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this 
moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is 
turned upside down again and again, and you with it, speck of 
dust!" 
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth 
and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once 
experienced a tremendous moment when you would have 
answered him: "You are a god and never have I heard anything 
more divine." If this thought gained possession of you, it would 
change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in 
each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and 
innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the 
greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to 
become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently 
than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?^ 
Nietzsche later presents a strikingly similar accoimt (down to 
the reference to the moonlight and spider) in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. In notes posthumously published in The Will to 
Power, Nietzsche calls eternal recurrence "the most scientific of all 
possible hypotheses."® He relates the idea of cyclical time as far 
back as at least Heraclitus.^ It is Zarathustra's "most abysmal 
thought."® The Will to Power contains a "proof" or the necessarily 
literal truth of the theory: 
If the world may be thought of as a certain definite 
quantity of force and as a certain definite number of centers of 
force—^and every other representation remains indefinite and 
therefore useless—^it follows that, in the great dice game of 
existence, it must pass through a calculable number of 
combinations. In infinite time, every possible combination 
would at some time or another be realized; more: it would be 
realized an infinite number of times. And since between every 
combination and its next recurrence all other possible 
combinations would have to take place, and each of these 
combinations conditions the entire sequence of combinations in 
the same series, a circular movement of absolutely identical 
series is thus demonstrated: the world as a circular movement 
that has already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its 
5 FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 273-74 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1974) 
[hereinafter NIETZSCHE, GAY SCIENCE]. 
® FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 36 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. 
Hollingdale trans., 1967) [hereinafter NIETZSCHE, WILL TO POWER]. 
^ RICHARD SCHACHT, NIETZSCHE 254-55 (1985). In his early lectures on the pre-
Platonic philosophers delivered when he was a yoxmg philology professor, he attributes 
cyclical cosmology even earlier to Anaximander. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE PRE-
PLATONIC PHILOSOPHERS 37 (Greg Whitlock trans., 2001) [hereinafter NIETZSCHE, THE 
PRE-PLATONICS]. 
8 NIETZSCHE, ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 1, at 216. 
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game in infinitum? 
Nietzsche states that eternal recurrence necessarily follows 
from the theories of eternal time and the conservation of energy 
and matter.!" ^hat is, if time is infinite but the physical world is 
finite, then there will be a limited number of combinations of the 
physical world that must repeat endlessly. 
Some Nietzscheans accept the proposition that Nietzsche 
must have believed in the probability, if not the necessity, of the 
literal truth of eternal recurrence on the grounds that it is hard to 
understand Nietzsche's excitement about the concept if he hadn't. 
For example, Arthur Danto states that: 
I have quoted this at length to show unequivocally that 
Nietzsche really was saying, not that similar things go on 
happening, not that there are always similar instances falling 
under the same law, not anything which ordinary common sense 
might suppose him to have meant: he meant that the very same 
things keep coming back again and again, themselves and not 
mere simulacra of themselves. He felt this to have been his 
most important teaching He was, according to Lou 
Salome, reluctant to disclose it to the world until he could find 
the scientific confirmation he thought it must have if it was to 
be accepted.!! 
Indeed, "[a]t one point [Nietzsche] even considered resuming 
student life, to study the natural sciences in order to find more 
support for a doctrine he believed to be of the utmost 
importance. "!2 Schacht argues that Nehamas' dismissal of 
Nietzsche's behef in eternal recurrence is inconsistent with his 
writings. 
At times, to be sure, [Nietzsche] seems less concerned with the 
truth of the doctrine than with the cultivation of an affirmative 
attitude toward life so great that one not only could endure the 
thought of an eternal recurrence ... but moreover could desire 
such a recurrence 
At other times, however, that with which Nietzsche is 
concerned is the demonstration of the truth of the 
proposition After all, there is nothing self-contradictory in 
both maintaining the truth of a doctrine and desiring that 
people should have an attitude toward life so positive that they 
can embrace it gladly 
That Nietzsche does hold this doctrine to be true is clear.!" 
Unfortunately, the problems with eternal recurrence as a 
9 NIETZSCHE, WILL TO POWER, supra note 6, at 549. 
10 "The law of the conservation of energy demands eternal recurrence." Id. at 547. 
" ARTHUR C. DANTO, NIETZSCHE AS PHILOSOPHER 203 (1965). 
12 Id. at 204. 
12 SCHACHT, supra note 4, at 44. 
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cosmology are obvious. The two underlying axioms—^that time is 
infinite but the physical world finite—are themselves 
controversial." Even if one accepts theses axiom arguendo, it can 
easily be shown that Nietzsche's conclusion that the same 
combinations must eventually and necessarily repeat an infinite 
number of times is false.^' If the theory cannot be proved logically, 
it is equally impossible to imagine how the theory as a cosmology 
could ever be empirically proven, or for that matter, disproved." 
A defense of a Nietzscheanism that requires the acceptance of the 
literal truth of eternal recurrence is, therefore, doomed from the 
beginning. If the hteral truth of eternal recurrence is necessary to 
Nietzsche's project, then it devolves to a religion that can only be 
accepted on faith. Consequently, some Nietzscheans have tried to 
show either that Nietzsche himself did not literally believe that 
eternal recurrence was necessary, or that his theory does not 
require such a literal belief." Perhaps it is sufficient if one merely 
accepts eternal recurrence as a possibility, not a necessity. Or, 
perhaps, it should be thought of as purely a thought experiment. 
For example, Nehamas points out that Nietzsche's only 
attempt at a cosmological or scientific defense of eternal 
recurrence as literal fact appears in notes published posthumously 
in The Will to Power. Nehamas argues that one should 
I'' For Kant, subjectivity itself is the birth of time and space—^the conditions of possible 
experience. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON 28-33 (T.K. Abbott 
trans., 1996). Modem physics suggests that both time and the physical universe, as we 
understand them, both came into being with the Big Bang. Some early theories of the Big 
Bang suggested that the expansion we are undergoing will eventually come to an end and 
that gravity will reverse the process until the universe collapses in a Big Crunch. This 
might suggest some form of cosmic etemal recurrence as the universe itself repeatedly 
explodes and implodes over eternity—^although it does not follow from this that each of us 
will relive our individual lives. More recent observations and theories suggest, however, 
that an eventual Big Crunch is unlikely. 
Since at least Georg Simmel's refutation (GEORG SIMMEL, SCHOPENHAUER UND 
NIETZSCHE 250-01 (1907), cited in SCHACHT, supra note 7, at 263-64), it has been obvious 
that the conclusion that Nietzsche believes necessarily follows from his axioms is in fact 
not logically required. It is a mathematical truism that an infinite series of a finite set need 
not result in a repeating pattem. The ratio pi is a familiar example. See also Danto's 
attempt to describe Nietzsche's proposed "scientific" proof of eternal recurrence. 
DANTO, supra note 11, at 206-09. 
16 
There can hardly be anything like evidence for the doctrine in any simple 
sense of "evidence." We could not, for example, find in the world as it now is 
any traces of another and exactly resemblant world or world state. If they do 
exactly resemble each other, there would be no traces or scars left by one upon 
the other to differentiate them 
DANTO, supra note 11, at 204. 
1' "The Etemal Recurrence of the same remains a vision for him, but also an enigma. 
It can be neither verified nor refuted logically or empirically." Martin Heidegger, Who is 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra, in THE NEW NIETZSCHE: CONTEMPORARY STYLES OF 
INTERPRETATION 64,75 (David B. Allison ed., 1985). 
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concentrate on what Nietzsche said in his published writings about 
eternal recurrence, which concentrate on the moral imphcations of 
the theoretical possibility, not the actuality, of eternal recurrence. 
In Nehamas's opinion, in the published works "eternal recurrence 
is not a theory of the world but a view of the self.'"® The 
statements published in The Will to Power are, at most, evidence 
that Nietzsche explored whether eternal recurrence might be 
literally true, not that he ever decided that it was, or, more 
importantly, that anything in his moral theory requires its literal 
truth." 
B. Eternal Recurrence and the Rejection of Teleology 
Under any interpretation, Nietzsche's idea of eternal 
recurrence is part and parcel of his fundamental rejection of the 
Christian and liberal teleologieal view of the universe or society. 
As Nietzsche says, "[l]et us think this thought in its most terrible 
form: existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet recurring 
inevitably without any finale of nothingness: 'the eternal 
recurrence.' This is the most extreme form of nihiUsm: the nothing 
(the 'meaningless') eternally!"^" 
Nietzsche's question for moral theory is how can one face, let 
alone live, one's life if God is dead and the universe serves no 
purpose? The doctrine, or perhaps metaphor, of eternal 
recurrence is developed as a means of exploring this problem. In 
Karl Lowith's words: 
The metaphor of the eternal recurrence is therefore equatable 
with something twofold: on the one hand, with an "ethical 
gravity" by means of which human existence that has become 
goalless obtains a goal again, beyond itself; and on the other 
hand, with a natural-scientific "fact" in the goalless self-
contained existence of the world of forces This double 
explicability as an atheistic religion and as a physical 
ALEXANDER NEHAMAS, NIETZSCHE: LIFE AS LITERATURE 150 (1985) (citation 
omitted). 
1' "Nietzsche does not at all set out to prove that the Return is actually inscribed in the 
coiuse of things; he rather introduces a simple fiction or a hypothesis, like a free play of 
the imagination, that comes out in the form of a question . ..." Michel Haar, Nietzsche 
and Metaphysical Language, in THE NEW NIETZSCHE: CONTEMPORARY STYLES OF 
INTERPRETATION 5,29 (David B. Allison ed., 1985). 
20 NIETZSCHE, WILL TO POWER, supra note 6, at 35-36. In Karl Lowith's words, "The 
'goal' of the earth, however, is 'the goallessness as such' of its revolving, just as the goal of 
the last metamorphosis is freedom from all goals and purposes, from every for-the-sake-
of." KARL LOWITH, NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE OF THE 
SAME 57 (J. Harvey Lomax trans., 1997). 
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metaphysics shows that in its totality the teaching is the unity of 
a conflict between the nihilistic existence of the man who has rid 
himself of God and the positivistic presence of physical energy 
Nietzsche invites us to consider eternal recurrence as the most 
extreme form of a goalless universe. Even if one accepts that there 
are no external teleology and one must create one's own 
individualistic goals, in the cyclical universe even subjective 
achievements are destined to pass away. 
Nietzsche's interest in cyclical time springs from his studies of 
the pre-Platonic philosophers as a young philology professor.^^ In 
this classical approach, events recur at the macro, if not the micro 
level. The world as a whole comes and goes. The seasons 
eternally recur with Winter leading to Spring to Summer to Fall 
and back to Winter. Nations come into existence, flourish, and 
fall. People are bom, become consumed in their petty loves and 
hatreds, and die. In this view, the world eternally repeats itself in 
general even though no individual year, nation or person is 
repeated exactly. The salient point about classical cyclicality is 
that it does not see the world progressing towards a teleological 
goal. Nehamas argues that some of Nietzsche's writings indicate 
that he was proposing only this broad concept of etemal 
recurrence. "[Nietzsche] is interested only in the realization that 
the world will continue to be more or less as it has always been so 
long as it exists, that no final state will redeem those who have 
gone before ... eternal recurrence is 'scientific' in that it is strictly 
nonteleological . . . Although this may be one aspect of 
Nietzsche's fascination with etemal recurrence, in my opinion it 
does not encompass the entire theory. Nietzsche's moral theory 
requires that we also consider the possibility that the world 
etemally recurs at the micro level of each individual.^" 
21 LOWITH, supra note 20, at 83. 
22 See supra note 7. 
23 NEHAMAS, supra note 18, at 145. This idea with respect to societies may have 
seemed more persuasive prior to the unprecedented advances in science and technology in 
the modem and post-modem eras. 
24 The distinction between a cyclical and teleological or progressive view of history can 
be seen by comparing Christian and pagan interpretation of the miracle of resurrection. 
When I was growing up, every Easter my well-meaning post-Vatican II parish priest would 
compare the resurrection of Christ with the rebirth of vegetation in the Spring. Of course, 
it is both a historical fact and a banal commonplace, that early Christianity incorporated 
into its Easter rites imagery taken from classical mystery religions which imagined that the 
com god—^whether known as Osiris, Adonis, Zagreus, or whoever—^was rebom every 
Spring. This simplistic truism, however, represses the radical difference between 
Christianity and paganism. To the pagan, Osiris and his brothers personified the vegetal 
life that dies and is rebom in a repeating etemal atemporality. In contrast, Christ's 
resurrection is cmcial precisely because it was unique. The Christian beheves that Christ 
was a historical individual who actually died and was rebom once and only once on a 
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Nietzsche, the former philologist, is fascinated with the 
classical world and his ideas are clearly influenced by his study of 
the pre-Platonics, but in no way is he a classical pagan. The 
ancients lived in an enchanted world in which cyclicality was 
imbued with spirit.^' Christianity rejected circularity in favor of 
teleology, but retained the insistence of spirit in the world. When 
the ostensibly Christian enlightenment reinterpreted Christian 
teleology in terms of scientific and intellectual progress it, in fact, 
eliminated the need for a belief in the Christian God. When 
Nietzsche rejected teleology, he was following enlightenment 
science to its logical extreme in declaring that God was now dead. 
Consequently, although he returned to the ancient idea of 
cychcaUty, he could not adopt its original form. Rather, he had to 
reconsider what cyclicality could mean in light of the moral 
problems posed by modernity.^® 
C. Eternity v. Universality 
What could morality be without either progress or spirit to 
guide us? Without God or purpose, Nietzsche must reject Kant's 
definition of morality as universality. Consequently, Nietzsche's 
famous denunciation of "morality" necessarily follows from his 
murder of God and denial of teleology.^' 
Of course, this necessary denunciation of "morality" is, in 
fact, only a denunciation of the Christian and Kantian 
specific date, in order to redeem its from the past historical reality of Original Sin in order 
to save us at the future historical event of the Last Judgment. 
25 That Nietzsche clearly recognizes this can be seen in his theory of the Apollonian 
and Dionysean principles set forth in The Birth of Tragedy. His third lectme on the pre-
Platonic philosophers necessarily consists of a consideration of the mytholo^cal 
cosmology that was the background in which these philosophers were working. 
NIETZSCHE, THE PRE-PLATONICS, supra note 7, at 10. 
26 
Because of the changed historical situation, however, the age-old idea of the 
eternal recurrence does not arise again unchanged, but instead is calamitously 
modernized The will to power is equally un-Greek: the will to power (as a 
will to something) wills the future, and is opposed to the eternal cycle of coming 
into being and passing away apart from will and purpose. 
LOWITH, supra note 20, at 120. 
27 
But the paradox of both contentions loses its offensiveness as soon as one 
understands that a teaching about man is groundless if it does not have a 
supporting basis either a metaphysical God or the physis of the world; for man 
does not exist through his own powers. And because for Nietzsche the 
transworldly God was dead, he had to ask anew the old cosmological question 
about the eternity of the world, as opposed to its single creation. 
Id. at 187. 
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understanding of that term. In fact, the moral question, "how do I 
live my hfe?" is a central thread running through Nietzsche's 
thought. Nietzsche's denial of "morality" is, therefore, a deeply 
moral act. It is the first step in the attempted creation of a new 
understanding of morahty. 
In order to answer this basic moral question, it is not sufficient 
to leave eternal recurrence at the macro-universal level, as 
Nehamas suggests. Nietzsche finds it necessary to at least consider 
the possibility that eternal recurrence operates at the micro-
individual level. Nietzsche's answer to Kantian morality is to 
create a paradoxical individualized understanding of universality: 
eternal recurrence. The universality of Kantian morality cuts 
across human subjects. The categorical imperative is moral 
because it applies to all men.^® Nietzsche, in effect, counters this 
with a moral law that applies not universally to all men, but 
eternally to one man.^' If Kant's test of morahty is "would I want 
this to apply universally to all menT' Nietzsche's test is "would I 
want this to apply eternally to me?" Consequently, Gilles Deleuze 
states that eternal recurrence, to Nietzsche "gives the will a rule as 
rigorous as the Kantian imperative.... As an ethical thought, the 
Eternal Return is a new formulation of the practical synthesis: 
Whatever you will, will it in such a way that you also will its Eternal 
Return?"^^ 
This aspect of eternal recurrence looks forward to Lacan's 
rewriting of concepts of universality and particularity associated 
with traditional moral theory.^' It is generally thought that there 
can be only one universal that might have numerous particular 
applications. As just stated, Kant famously formulates his 
^ "Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold good as a 
principle of universal legislation." KANT, supra note 14, at 46. See also IMMANUEL 
KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 17 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1996). 
29 
In this anthropological interpretation, the eternally same recurrence appeared as 
an ethical task, renewing itself in every moment for the willing man for whom 
this teaching is to replace the Christian belief in immortality. In the 
cosmological interpretation, by contrast, the recurrence appeared not as a "plan 
for a new way to live" and a "will to rebirth" but as destruction and rebirth that 
happens by nature and that is completely indifferent to all plans made by man 
out of his thrownness. 
LOWITH, supra note 20, at 156-57. 
^ Gilles Deleuze, Active and Reactive, in THE NEW NIETZSCHE; CONTEMPORARY 
STYLES OF INTERPRETATION 80,100 (David B. Alhson ed., 1985). Similarly, Thomas J. J. 
Altizer calls the idea of eternal recurrence "Nietzsche's categorical imperative—the most 
awful and awesome that man has ever faced . . . ." Thomas J. J. Altizer, Eternal 
Recurrence and Kingdom of God, in THE NEW NIETZSCHE: CONTEMPORARY STYLES OF 
INTERPRETATION 232,241 (David B. Allison ed., 1985). 
31 SLAVOJ ZI2EK THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER: AN ESSAY ON SCHELLING AND 
RELATED MATTERS 217 (1996) [hereinafter ZIZEK, THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER]. 
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categorical imperative as a test of whether a maxim can serve as a 
moral law. The moral is universal and universality is defined as 
that which applies to everyone in every situation. One of the 
moral dilemmas inherent in Kantianism, of course, is that every 
person and every situation is different and particular. How, then, 
can we ever know if our acts are a correct application of the 
universal to the particular—and therefore moral—or merely 
pathological and particular—and therefore immoral.^' 
Lacan doesn't so much turn Kant on his head, as inside out: 
there is only one particular, but there are unlimited universals. 
The one particular is the constitutive split that creates my 
individual subject and any specific symbolic order. This split is a 
logical paradox that necessarily underlies all concepts. The 
specific manifestation of this split within any individual or society 
is universalized within individual or society, so that it affects every 
aspect of it. Lacan interprets this constituent split as the sexual 
impasse. 
It is easy to misinterpret Lacan as being ethnocentric on the 
grounds that, although this constituent split might be sexual in 
modern Western society, it manifests itself in some other 
distinction or division within that society. But, according to Slavoj 
Zizek, that was precisely Lacan's point. The split is universal only 
within a person or society. Indeed, it is that very specificity that is 
universalized. In our society, this spht is a specific sexual hierarchy 
whereby the masculine represents the imiversal (that is, mankind) 
and the feminine the exception (sexuality per se). This is 
universalized in our society throughout the structure of the 
symbohc order. It is not surprising, but predictable, that this split 
32 Kant's answer, of course, is that we can never know whether we are acting morally 
(purely out of duty to the moral law) or out of pathology (i.e., subjective, particular). See, 
e.g., KANT, supra note 14, at 92; Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Stumbling Block Freedom, 
Rationality, and Legal Scholarship, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263 (2002) [hereinafter 
Schroeder, The Stumbling Block]; Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, 
Appearance of Wrong and the Essence of Right: Metaphor and Metonymy in Law, 24 
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming Summer 2003). This means, on the one hand, every 
human act is always smeared with a primal, "radical evil." On the other hand, this lack of 
knowledge—the ability to choose to do wrong-^s the source of man's freedom. 
According to Kant, if man could, like God, truly know the moral law, he would not 
become divine but a "marionette or an automaton." KANT, supra note 14, at 123. As I 
have said elsewhere: 
If the self were noumenal, then God (a noumenon) would be our equal. God 
would stand before our eyes as directly perceivable. We would lose our 
freedom, if we could directly know God's law. We would be mere puppets in the 
thrall of the moral law. Ironically, morality would become legality, and morality 
would be thoroughly pathological—that is, natural. 
Jeanne L. Schroeder & David Gray Carlson, Kenneth Starr: Diabolically Evil?, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 653,667 (2000) (citations omitted). 
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would be universalized in a different way in different societies and 
within different individuals.^^ 
Similarly, Nietzsche, who tries to reject the universal, finds 
one specific—the problem of eternal recurrence—which he locates 
at the level of individual subjectivity. It is specific because each 
man experiences it differently—each has his own unique pain, 
horror, and humiliation that he thinks he could not bear to repeat. 
Each subject must find a way to universalize the specificity of 
recurrence within his own life to establish a "moral law that 
makes his life not merely bearable but triumphant. 
D. The Implications of Eternal Recurrence 
If one is to consider the moral law of a world with no goal, 
then one must try to imagine the most extreme view of a goalless 
world. According to Nietzsche, this would be a world in which 
nothing is unique, but everything recurs over and over again down 
to the most mundane detail. Such a world would not merely lack 
necessary, external, objective goals, but would also seem to rule 
out the possibility of creating contingent, internal, subjective goals 
because everything one might achieve is preordained to pass away. 
What would be the implications of this hypothesis? 
L Infinite Universals. As I suggested, one imphcation dra^ 
by Nietzsche is that the traditional Kantian categorical imperative 
grounded on universality be replaced with a new Nietzschean 
categorical imperative grounded on eternity. One should no 
longer try to conform one's actions to an axiom that should apply 
to all men. Rather, one should try to hve one's life so that one 
would be willing to repeat one's acts eternally. In Haar's words: 
[T]he doctrine of the Return constitutes an ethical claim. We 
are to act at every instant as though each of our acts were 
destined to be repeated an infinite number of times in exactly 
the same way: in my own life I am to try to modify my 
relationship with the instant, to will each act just as intensely as 
though it were not destined to pass, but rather to remain 
eternally. I should will the idea that what I now do involves my 
eternal being. However, this ethic opposes in reality every 
categorical imperative ("I should") and proposes in contrast an 
33 For example, Zizek repeats that some scholars have argued that the universality of 
the sexes was reversed in Ancient China so that woman represented the universal aspect 
of humanity and man the specific of sexuality. ZIZEK, THE INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER, 
supra note 31, at 217. 
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imperative of necessity ("I am constrained to").^" 
Nietzsche presents the possibility of eternal recurrence as an 
initially horrifying possibility. One would have to relive all of the 
pains and humiliations in life, to re-witness all of its horrors, to 
know everything one despised again and again and again. One 
would have to face what it means to live in a world in which God is 
dead and the world is no longer enchanted: i.e., there is no 
external purpose or goal of life. In Kaufmann's words, "the notion 
that everything recurs eternally in identical fashion reduces life to 
'a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying 
nothing.Eternal recurrence would seem to be a recipe for 
suicide except for the fact that one would then have to face an 
eternity of suicide. 
Consequently, stripped of external moral support, the 
superior man eventually realizes that the only meaning his life 
could have is the meaning he gives himself. As Danto puts it: 
[i]n another respect the doctrine was encouraging as well, which 
was the obverse of the absence of any higher condition. There 
could be no lower condition, or no lowest condition that could 
be final. There would be no drying up, no dying away, no 
fatally disordered universe, eternally arrested in its abiding 
death.^'' 
He continues: "And, by parity, there is no meaning to the 
universe if it has no end. So man must give it one."^' 
This cannot mean, however, that we should seek to achieve 
some goal. Since everything is destined to go under in the 
revolving cycle of destruction and creation, no goal can be truly 
aehieved as all are doomed to eventual failure. Moreover, seeking 
to achieve a goal cannot satisfy Nietzsche, who believes that one is 
one's actions, not one's conscious subjective state of mind. 
Once one comes to this realization, one should be able to stop 
brooding about the past and learn to embrace it.'® This is because 
in order for one to accept one's life now, or to look forward to the 
future, one must also accept everything that has gone before. 
Consequently, in order to be able to say "yes!" to the triumphal 
movements of life, one must also be willing to say "yes!" to the 
^ Haar, supra note 19, at 31-32. 
35 Walter Kaufmann, Translator's Notes to NIETZSCHE, GAY SCIENCE, supra note 5, 
at 3,18. 
3® DANTO, supra note 11, at 211. 
37 Id. 
38 "Nietzsche writes that instead of seeking revenge for a wrong, it is better to show 
that an enemy has done one some good. Instead of resenting a harm, it is better to use it 
as material for further development and so to prevent it from constituting a harm at all. 
NEHAMAS, supra note 18, at 161. 
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nauseating and banal ones, or, in Nietzsche's words, to "even this 
spider and this moonlight."'' As Heidegger states: 
Deliverance from revenge is the bridge from contempt for 
time, to the will that represents beings in the Eternal 
Recurrence of the same, in which the will becomes the advocate 
of the circle. 
In other words: only when the Being of beings is 
represented to man as the Eternal Recurrence of the same, only 
then can man cross the bridge and, crossing over, be delivered 
from the spirit of revenge 
Ironically, if Nietzsche is the apostle of eternal recurrence, 
and if eternal recurrence is supposed to relieve ressentiment, then 
his enterprise would seem to be a failure. Was there ever a 
philosopher more trapped by resentment? His work, Zarathustra 
in particular, is filled with disgust of other people to the point of 
nausea.'' Indeed, according to Nietzsche, the horror that needs to 
be confronted before one can accept the idea of eternal recurrence 
is precisely the continued existence of these loathsome others. 
Nietzsche's very obsession with overcoming ressentiment is vivid 
testimony that he never succeeded in doing so. 
2. Today on Oprah — Nietzsche! No doubt, these two 
implications are part of Nietzsche's point. But if this is all there is 
to Nietzsche, as Nehamas argues, then he is banal. Considering 
the possibility of eternal recurrence might be perfectly good 
prudential advice about how to live a healthy, satisfying life. But it 
would be hardly more profound than that doled out everyday on 
afternoon TV: Don't worry, be happy. 
A Lacanian spin on Nietzsche—as well as on Nehamas' 
attempt to domesticate eternal recurrence—^raises some more 
interesting issues. A simple reading of eternal recurrence reflects 
the "masculine" psychoanalytical position of subjectivity in which 
3' See supra quote at note 5. 
Heidegger, supra note 17, at 74. 
See, e.g., NIETZSCHE, ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 1, at 219. Nietzsche stated that: 
'Eternally recurs the man of whom you are weary, the small man'—^thus yawned 
my sadness and dragged its feet and could not go to sleep.... '[ajlas, man recurs 
eternally? The small man recurs eternally!' 
. . .  A n d  t h e  e t e r n a l  r e c u r r e n c e  e v e n  o f  t h e  s m a l l e s t — ^ t h a t  w a s  m y  d i s g u s t  w i t h  a l l  
existence. Alas! Nausea! Nausea! Nausea! 
Id. 
Perhaps the most disturbing image in Zarathustra is the prophet's surreal vision 
inspired by the thought of eternal recurrence. Zarathustra's nausea is personified as a 
man choking on a snake that has crawled into his mouth and sunk its teeth into his throat. 
He can free himself only through the even more nauseating act of biting off the snake's 
head. Id. at 159. 
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the subject tries to avoid the implications of the horror of 
castration by falsely claiming to have the phallus. The attempt by 
Nehamas (and perhaps Nietzsche himself) both to claim to reject a 
hteral reading of eternal recurrence, while nevertheless Uving 
one's life as though it were true, can be seen as what Lacan called 
a fetishist split—^the attempt to have one's cake and eat it, too. 
More interestingly, however, the development of eternal 
recurrence may be an attempt by Nietzsche to replace desire with 
drive. If so, it can be read as an intuitive attempt by the neurotic, 
and soon to be psychotic, Nietzsche to achieve a psychoanalytic 
"cure." If so, this cure turned out to be unsuccessful for Nietzsche, 
personally. Can it be any more successful for attorneys? 
II. NIETZSCHE ON THE COUCH 
A. Background 
Lacan famously ignores Nietzsche. In this paper I will ignore 
the interesting possibility that this might say something more 
about Lacan than about Nietzsche. In this section I introduce a 
simplified account of certain aspects of Lacanian theory. 
Lacan posits that the subject is split."^ The subject is therefore 
represented by the matheme "S" (i.e., the matheme S, which 
stands for a signifier, bifurcated by a "bar"). This does not mean 
that the subjectivity once had a pre-existing affirmative content 
that was lost throu^ trauma. Rather, it is the much more radical 
proposition that subjectivity is nothing but negativity or lack per 
se. Subjectivity only comes into being with the spUtting of the 
personality; there can be no whole, unsplit subject. Consequently, 
the expression "the subject is split" is not equivalent to "the 
subject has been split" but rather "the subject equals the split.""' 
As we shall see, this is sometimes expressed in the intentionally 
misleading metaphor of castration. 
I explain this phenomena at length elsewhere. See, e.g., JEANNE L. SCHROEDER, 
THE TRIUMPH OF VENUS: THE EROTICS OF THE MARKET (forthcoming 2003); JEANNE 
L. SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES: HEGEL, LACAN, PROPERTY AND THE 
FEMININE 87-94 (1998) [hereinafter SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES]; 
Jeanne L. Schroeder, The Midas Touch: The Lethal Effects of Wealth Maximization, 1999 
WIS. L. REV. 687, 731-35; Jeanne L. Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis 
of Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 483, 505-06 (1998) [hereinafter Schroeder, 
The End of the Market]. The following is an abbreviated version of these more complete 
discussions. 
« Schroeder, The End of the Market, supra note 42, at 501-02 n.58; see also BRUCE 
FINK, THE LACANIAN SUBJECT: BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND JOUISSANCE 45 (1995). 
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The adult split subject is located in the three psychic orders of 
the real, the imaginary and the symbolic."'' Roughly, the symbohc 
is the social order of signification that includes such concepts of 
language, sexuahty, and law. The imaginary, as the term suggests, 
is the order of imagery, picture thinking, and the simple forms of 
meaning of which animals are capable. The real is our intuition 
that there exists more to the world that can be contained in the 
symbohc and the imaginary—^it is literally and figuratively that 
which cannot be described in words or pictures. 
Just as it is tempting to imagine that the subject originaUy had 
an affirmative character and integrity that was subsequently rent, 
it is tempting to think, first, that there was a time when the three 
orders perfectly joined in a holistic unity and, second, that the real 
is the part of that original unity that remained after the symbolic 
and imaginary were spht off. In fact, like the subject, each of the 
three orders—^including the real—only came into being at the 
moment of their splitting apart."^ Nothing pre-existed the split. 
The social order of the symbolic, like the subject, is 
incomplete—^in Lacan's famous formulation the Other (the 
symbohc) does not exist."® This is not the palpably siUy assertion 
that the symbolic does not function."^ Rather, it is the proposition 
See Jacqueline Rose, Introduction II, in JACQUES LACAN AND THE ECOLE 
FREUDIENNE, FEMININE SEXUALITY 27, 31 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds., 
Jacqueline Rose trans., 1985); JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR QF JACQUES LACAN 
BQQK I; FREUD'S PAPERS QN TECHNIQUE 80 (J-A. Miller ed., J. Forrester trans., 1988) 
[hereinafter Rose, LACAN, SEMINAR I]; see also generally ELIZABETH GRQSZ, JACQUES 
LACAN: A FEMINIST INTRQDUCTIQN 10 (1990). As is the case with virtually all of 
Lacan's concepts, not only are three orders extremely complex, Lacan's thinking about 
them developed over time. For example, in the early seminars of the 1950s, Lacan 
concentrated more on the contrast between the symbolic and the imaginary, whereas his 
later seminars put more emph£isis on the real, indeed, it seems that over time, Lacan 
shifted some of the functions he originally assigned to the imaginary over to the real. I 
have expUcated on the three orders and their implications for law and economics at great 
length elsewhere and shall not repeat that discussion here. I will merely reiterate a few 
crucial points. 
-•s Although we experience it in this way, "the Real is not a hard external kernel which 
resists symbolization, but the product of a deadlock in the process of symbolization." 
ZI2EK, INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER, supra note 31, at 110. 
Jacques-Alain Miller, Extimite, in LACANIAN THEORY QF DISCOURSE: SUBJECT, 
STRUCTURE, AND SOCIETY 74, 81 (Mark Bracher et al. eds., 1994). This prefigured his 
even more infamous pronouncement that Woman does not exist. JACQUES LACAN, THE 
SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: ON FEMININE SEXUALITY, THE LIMITS OF LOVE AND 
KNOWLEDGE: BOOK XX, ENCORE 1972-1973, at 72-74 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Bruce 
Fink trans., 1988) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR XX]. "What has a body and does not 
exist? Answer—the big Other." JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN. 
BOOK XVII: THE OTHER SIDE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (Jacques-Alain Miller ed. 1991) 
(unpublished translation of JACQUES LACAN, SEMINAIRE LIVRE XVII: L'ENVERS DE LA 
PSYCHANALYSE 74 (1991) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR XVII] (on file with author). 
Lacan tries to capture the fact that the big Other functions despite the fact that it 
does not "exist" in his statement that it nevertheless has a "body." "If we believe in this 
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that the symbolic is not pre-existing, necessary, objective, 
complete, and permanent.^® As an artificial human creation it is 
contingent, subjective (or, more accurately, intersubjective), open-
ended, and in a constant state of flux. The symbolic order does not 
function externally to the subjects who are subjected to it. It only 
functions because, and insofar as, we act as though it exists. 
Because the subject is split, she is characterized by desire. 
Indeed, subjectivity is nothing but desire understood as the 
impetus for the healing of the split, resulting in the completion of 
the subject and the collapse of the three orders back into a 
hypothetical primal unity. As Debra Bergoffen accurately states 
in her comparison of Nietzsche's and Lacan's notions of 
subjectivity, "[a]s desire, the human subject is the lack seeking to 
overcome itself as lack; the finitude seeking immortahty; the 
limited in quest of the unlimited; the singular seeking the 
absolute.""" Because the subject is nothing but its constituent split, 
desire is by definition always unsatisfied and unsatisfiable. If the 
subject ever were to achieve her desire and become complete, she 
would no longer be a subject. The most characteristic form of the 
desiring subject is the feminine position of hysteria^" that I discuss 
in the last section of this paper. 
Lacan's metaphor that the split subject is "castrated reflects 
the mistaken way we try to explain our constituent split to 
ourselves. As I have said, it is easy to presume from the fact that 
the subject is split now that there might have been an earlier time 
when the subject was whole. Similarly with respect to desire, it is 
easy to presume that the reason why we feel lacking is that we lack 
something. The metaphor of castration reflects the fact that we 
feel that we once had that which made us whole but have lost it. 
In keeping with this metaphor, the hypothetical object lost in 
castration is called the "phallus." Of course none of this is hterally 
big Other, it has a body, ineliminable from the substance of he who has said / am what I 
am, which is another form of tautology altogether." Id. 
I discuss this concept at length in Schroeder, The Stumbling Block, supra note 32. 
Debra B. Bergoffen, Nietzsche's Madman: Perspectivism Without Nihilism, in 
NIETZSCHE AS POSTMODERNIST: ESSAYS PRO AND CONTRA 57, 58 (Qayton Koelb ed., 
1990). . r.. •• 
50 "[Tlhe "hysterical 'desire to desire', far from being a defective mode of desire, is, 
rather, its paradigmatic case, desire tout court...." ZI2EK, INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER, 
supra note 31, at 167. "A more than sufficient reason for maintaining the notion of 
h y s t e r i a  i s  t h a t  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t  a s  s u c h  i s  u l t i m a t e l y  h y s t e r i c a l . "  I d .  a t  I M .  
51 laran insisted on the "universality of the process of castration as the unique path of 
access to desire and sexual normativisation " JACQUES LACAN AND THE ^COLE 
FREUDIENNE, FEMININE SEXUALITY 118 (Juliet Mitchell & Jacqueline Rose eds., 
Jacqueline Rose trans., 1985). . . 
I have called castration the "universal initiation rite of subjectivity. SCHROEDER, 
THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 42, at 80. 
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true. Nevertheless, we cling to this idea because, if it were true, 
then it would explain our feeling of dislocation." Now we can 
consider Lacan's extremely complex notion of the objet petit a and 
contrast it to his notoriously confusing concept of the phallus. 
The objet petit a is Lacan's term for the "object cause of 
desire."" I shall introduce only one aspect of this idea here. The 
fantasy of the objet petit a is an attempt to positivize one's lack by 
identifying it with a specific object that one imagines might have 
caused the lack that results in one's desire.'" This objet petit a is an 
imaginary object that serves as a little piece of the real in the 
symbolic." The object little a can be an object either of delight or 
disgust. On the one hand, the rift in ourselves and the social order 
could be explained by the absence of something wonderful. 
Wholeness could, therefore, be restored if this missing object were 
obtained. On the other hand, this rift could be explained by the 
presence of something terrible eating away at, or polluting us. 
Integrity could be restored, therefore, if the object were 
eliminated. 
The problem is obvious. Both of these explanations ot our 
desire are imaginary. Our desire is not really caused by the object 
httle a, but is constituent of our subjectivity. This means that 
desire paradoxically precedes its imaginary cause. If we were 
ever to acquire or destroy any specific object serving as our little a. 
52 In other words, castration is an "abduction." 
53 FINK, supra note 43, at 83-97. , j u 
54 ScHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supru note 42, at 8. As explained by 
Zizcki 
In this precise sense, a is the object-cause of desire; it does not effectively pre­
exist desire as that which arouses it, it merely gives body to its inherent 
deadlock, to the fact that desire is never satisfied by any positive object; that is to 
say, apropos of every positive object, the subject's experience will always be a 
'this is not that.' 
ZIZEK, INDIVISIBLE REMAINDER, supra note 31, at 144. 
55 "It is Lacan who—^in a Hegelian way—enables us to resolve ... the fallout, ot the 
very process of symbolization What is stolen, betrayed ... is always objet petit a, the 
little piece of the Real." SLAVOJ ZI2EK, THE ABYSS OF FREEDOM 27 (1997) [hereinafter 
ZIZEK, ABYSS]. 
56 In the words of Zizek: . . • 
How are we to understand this strange reversal? In prindple, things are clear 
enough: by way of positing itself as its own cause, the subject fully assumes the 
fact that the object-cause of its desire is not a cause that precedes its effects but 
is retroactively posited by the network of its effects: an event is never simply in 
itself traumatic, it only becomes a trauma retroactively, by being "secreted" 
from the subject's symbolic space as its inassimilable point of reference. In this 
precise sense, the subject "causes itself" by way of retroactively positing 
which acts as the object-cause of its desire. This loop is constitutive of the 
subject; that is, an entity that does not "cause itself is precisely not a subject but 
an object. 
Id. at 19. 
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we would remain as desirous as before and would have to change 
our fantasy. Consequently, we typically invent obstacles to stand 
between ourselves and our object little a purely for the purpose of 
keeping us from attaining it, thereby sustaining our desire.'" 
We can now see the difference between the object little a 
which is the object cause of desire and Lacan's concept of the 
phallus which is the object of desire. The object little a, being 
imaginary, is an attempt to positivize our lack, to give it affirmative 
content. The phallus is symbolic and, like the subject and the 
symbolic order, is negativity per se—^the phallus is thus nothing but 
the symbolization of lack, and therefore of subjectivity. 
There is, nevertheless, a strong tendency to want to give 
positive status to the phallus. For example, as the metaphor so 
graphically illustrates, we conflate the phallus with the penis. This 
is, by definition, illusory. Insofar as the phallus stands for that 
which is missing, it also stands for that which would fill in the hole 
that is the lack. In this sense the phallus is "the lack of a lack" 
what it would mean if our constituent lack were lacking. The 
grammatical logic of the double negative leads us to imagine that 
the lack of a lack must be something positive—^in the sense that 
negative one multiphed by negative one equals positive one. But, 
this hypothesized positive object is not the phallus but the objet 
petit a—a fantasy. 
The phallus cannot be analogized to negative one because the 
concept of negative one is not, in fact, radically negative—negative 
one has the positive characteristic of "quantity." Lacan has been 
ridiculed for saying that the phallus is literally (not metaphorically) 
the square root of negative one.'^ But it is precisely his point that 
the phallus is that which remains negative even when multiplied by 
itself. 
s'' In other words, "the 'cause of desire' must be in itself a metonymy of lack—that is to 
sav ,  an  objec t  which  i s  not  s imply  lack ing  but ,  in  i t s  ve^  pos i t iv i ty ,  g ives  body  to  a  lack . . . .  
a 'something that stands for nothing...SLAVOJ ZI2EK, THE PLAGUE OF FANTASIES 
81 (1997) 
In their notorious broadside against postmodernism, Alan Sokal and Jean Bricourt 
claim that Lacan holds that the "erectile organ... is equivalent to the (square root of 
negative one)." Chief Executive, Is it Science, or Just Plain Silly, at 
http://www.chiefexec.net/mag/162/162b.htm (quoting ALAN SOKAL & JEAN BRICMOOT, 
FASHIONABLE NONSENSE: POSTMODERN INTELLECTUALS (1998)). Of course, this 
statement shows that they are in fact not familiar with Lacan's theory. Lacan remarks are 
about the phallus, not the penis. Indeed, in his essay Subversion of the Subject and 
Dialectic of Desire, Lacan describes the square root of negative one as "what the subject 
lacks." JACQUES LACAN, ECRITS: A SELECTION 307,317 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977). 
2003] CAN LA WYERS BE CURED? 943 
B. The Masculine Position 
We now explore Lacan's terminology and how it relates to his 
theory of sexuality. The Lacanian subject is not only split, it is 
always also necessarily sexuated. To Lacan, sexuality is not 
biology. It is the position one takes with respect to one's 
constituent split. Nevertheless, sexuahty is "figured" by anatomy 
and it is this figuring that is reflected not only in the metaphors 
that Lacan employs, but in the way we view ourselves and live our 
hves. 
That which the subject lacks is the phallus. Accordingly, the 
split subject who is lacking the phallus is "castrated." This 
terminology obviously reflects a masculine sexual metaphor. The 
masculine position of subjectivity is the denial of castration. That 
is, the masculine aspect of personality is the part that cannot bear 
to face the fact of his own lack. Consequently, he tries to delude 
himself by falsely claiming to be whole: he claims to have the 
phallus. For reasons beyond the scope of this paper, in our society 
this position is associated with anatomically male human beings. 
Consequently, when we try to positivize the phallus we conflate it 
with that which men have—^the penis (hence Lacan's terminology). 
In contrast, the feminine position is the part of personality 
that accepts the fact of castration. The feminine subject recognizes 
that her lack is self-constituting. The feminine, therefore, stands in 
the place of lack. If "he" claims to have the phallus, "she" is the 
phallus—^that which is by definition lacking. Consequently, we 
also conflate the phallus with that which women are—^the female 
body. 
I have written extensively about how the masculine claim that 
the male subject and the symbolic order are complete plays out in 
the symbolic realm of law, and shall not repeat it here. I discuss 
the feminine position and law below. 
1. Eternal Recurrence and the Masculine Position 
A simple Lacanian reading of eternal recurrence is that it is an 
attempt of Nietzsche to take on the masculine position despite the 
fact that much of his philosophy is radically feminine in the 
Lacanian sense. That is, the masculine Nietzsche cannot bear to 
face the truth that the feminine Nietzsche tries to reveal. 
Nietzsche's comments about women are notorious and legion. 
Some Nietzscheans try to dismiss these statements as unfortunate 
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remnants of nineteenth century misogyny which should be ignored 
because they are not central to his theory.^' Others try to explain 
them away in one way or another. In one of my favorite examples, 
I remember reading an essay in which the author quotes a friend, a 
feminist psychoanalyst, who claimed that Nietzsche's statements 
change from being problematic to being completely 
understandable if one replaces all references to "women" with 
"my mother." 
In this paper I will give neither an exegesis nor a defense of 
Nietzsche's theory of woman, per se. No doubt, much of what 
Nietzsche has to say is just old-fashioned misogyny. I merely 
suggest in passing, however, that one can find in Nietzsche a 
premonition of the Lacanian understanding of the feminine as the 
radical negativity of the subject.®" 
Here, I point out that although, on the one hand, some 
aspects of Nietzsche's thought reflect a feminine understanding of 
the inevitability of castration, on the other, the "masculine" 
Nietzsche tries to deny the implications in his problematic doctrine 
of eternal recurrence. This may explain both why Nietzsche was 
so drawn to eternal recurrence and why so many Nietzscheans find 
it embarrassing. 
As introduced, the feminine position is the acceptance of 
castration. This is not merely the realization that the subject is 
split. Because she is not wholly subject to the symbolic order, the 
feminine subject can also see that the symbolic order (law, 
language, sexuahty) is split. In Lacan's famous formulation, "the 
big Other does not exist" in the sense that it is not pre-existing, 
permanent, necessary, or objective. The feminine acceptance of 
castration is a denial of purpose and teleology in the sense that it is 
an understanding that there was never an original state of grace 
that was once lost, nor is there an external goal (such as the return 
to grace) or ideal to which we are, or should be, progressing. 
Consequently, Lacan insists on, but rewrites, the Christian 
doctrine of creation ex nihilo—creation from nothing. There is no 
pre-existing substance out of which we make our lives; we are on 
5' Walter Kaufmann, in particular, has popularized this approach. See, e.g., WALTER 
KAUFMANN, NIETZSCHE: PHILOSOPHER, PSYCHOLOGIST, ANTICHRIST 84 (1968). 
» In the last section of this paper I suggest that the effective attorney must take on the 
feminine position and become a hysteric. This suggests that much of what Nietzsche says 
about women should be equally applicable to lawyers. Indeed, to paraphrase that 
unnamed female psychoanalyst, perhaps Nietzsche would become more understandable if 
every time he used the word "woman" we replaced it with "attorney." For ex^ple, "The 
attorney does not want truth: what is truth to an attorney? From the beginning, nothing 
has been more alien, repugnant, and hostile to the attorney than truth—her greatest art is 
the lie, her highest concern is mere appearance " 
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our own. The feminine subject realizes that, just as we create the 
symbolic order, we must create our own local, possible goals. The 
feminine also recognizes, however, that all attempts to achieve our 
goals are destined to fail—desire can never be fulfilled. 
Consequently, the feminine must concentrate not on the 
achievement of goals, which is impossible, but on the act itself. 
Consequently, to Lacan, the feminine is the position of pure doing. 
Put this way, the Lacanian feminine sounds surprisingly like 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche, unfortunately, does not have the fortitude to 
remain a woman. Unable ultimately to bear the thought of 
castration, he reverts to masculinity and adopts the doctrine of 
eternal recurrence. Eternal recurrence is a masculine strategy by 
which one can both recognize that castration has occurred, while at 
the same time denying it. As I shall discuss shortly, the specific 
strategy adopted by Nehamas might be that of fetishism. 
The most crude way the masculine denies castration is the 
empty claim of possession. He merely insists that he has the 
phallus despite all evidence to the contrary. This is the insistence 
that he is whole, objective, and in control—^that there is nothing 
missing. Obviously this position cannot be sustained permanently. 
When the masculine is forced to confront the fact that he and 
the symbolic order do not meet this criteria, he adopts alternate 
strategies to avoid the imphcations. The typical alternative to a 
claim of possession is a claim of exchange. The masculine tells 
himself that the reason why he does not have the phallus (is not 
complete) now, is not because he has lost the phallus, nor because 
it has been taken away from him in castration. Rather, he has only 
temporarily and conditionally given up the phallus in exchange for 
a substitute one in the future. That is, a present possessory 
property claim is replaced with an imaginary executory contract 
for future delivery. 
This is Lacan's rewriting of Freud's Oedipal family romance." 
The "incest taboo" is not the literal (or real) "do not sleep with 
your mother or murder your father." It is the symbolic injunction 
of the superego to the subject not to seek to become whole, and to 
To Lacan, the Oedipal complex does not reflect the actual experience of childhood 
development (that is, children do not literally want to have sex with their mothers and kill 
their fathers), but a retroactive re-imagining of childhood from the perspective of 
adulthood. As Lacan says in his Seventh Seminar on the ethics of psychoanalysis; "One 
shouldn't forget that in a sense Oedipus did not suffer from the Oedipus complex, and he 
punished himself for a sin he did not commit He flees those whom he thinks are his 
parents, and commits a crime in trying to avoid it." JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF 
JACQUES LACAN BOOK VII: THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 1959-60, at 304 (Jacques-
Alain Miller ed., Dennis Porter trans., 1992) (1986) [hereinafter LACAN, SEMINAR VII]. 
As Lacan elaborates in Seminar XVII, "the Oedipus complex is Freud's dream. Like all 
dreams it needs to be interpreted." LACAN, SEMINAR XVII, supra note 46, at 159. 
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merge the three orders back into a mythological pre-subjective 
unity. The primal integrity that is lost in castration is imagined as 
the uterine union with the feminine as the phallic mother. In order 
for the masculine infant to be initiated into the symbolic order of 
adulthood, he must obey the law of the Father and shift his 
identification away from the feminine to the masculine. 
Castration is, therefore, the perceived loss of access to the 
feminine. The child retroactively rationalizes this "loss" by 
fantasizing that it is only one half of a bargain. If the masculine 
subject retroactively acquiesces in his loss of the feminine as 
phallic mother now, it is because he fantasizes that the symbolic 
order will provide him in the future with the feminine in the form 
of a perfect mate who will make him whole. By doing so, the 
symbolic order will recognize the masculine subject as one of its 
members. In this way, the masculine can claim that he has not 
"lost" the phallus because he has only temporarily ceded one 
phallus in the expectation of the imminent acquisition of another 
one. This is played out in traditional cultures, including our own 
until extremely recently, in which masculine solidarity is achieved 
by excluding women from the public and social (expulsion of the 
phallic mother from the symbolic), and the exchange of women in 
marriage. Needless to say, this strategy is never completely 
successful—^we are all castrated and the phallus cannot make us 
whole because it is nothing but lack itself. As I have suggested 
elsewhere, "the masculine gives up something he never had (the 
feminine in the form of the phallic mother) in exchange for 
something that doesn't exist (the feminine in the form or a perfect 
mate) to achieve something with no content (subjectivity)."®^ 
Eternal recurrence can be interpreted as an attempt to obtain 
and retain the phallus through exchange. Nietzsche—the 
woman—at one moment understands that she and the symbolic 
order are castrated. There is no "objective teleological truth that 
will order her life; one's personality is a work in progress created 
ex nihilo. But, at the next moment, Nietzsche—^the man—cannot 
bear this thought and seeks a way to regain the phallus that he has 
just declared to be non-existent. 
The way out of this seeming dilemma is action: to hve one's 
life so that one experiences at least one moment that, if endlessly 
62 SCHROEDER, THE VESTAL AND THE FASCES, supra note 42, at 85. "I ^ye 
something in exchange for nothing—or (and therein consists its fundamental paradox), m 
so far as the incestuous object is in itself impossible, I pve nothing in exchange for 
something (the 'permitted' non-incestuous object)." SLAVOJ ZI2EK, KNOW 
NOT WHAT THEY DO: ENJOYMENT AS A POLITICAL FACTOR 231 (1991) [hereinafter 
ZizEK, FOR THEY KNOW NOT WHAT THEY DO]. 
2003] CAN LA WYERS BE CURED? 947 
repeated, would not merely make the countless banal sufferings of 
the rest of one's life not merely bearable, but acceptable or even 
wanted. That is, "[i]t does not matter that we pass away and 
return and pass away again. What counts is what we eternally do, 
the joy in overcoming, whatever our task may be, and the meaning 
we give to our lives."" By definition, Nietzsche cannot suggest a 
universal rule for any man to follow in order to achieve this self-
justifying subjective moment. 
2. Ressentiment 
A second implication of the possibility of eternal recurrence is 
an argument as to how one could avoid ressentiment the 
cankerous bitterness and envy that plagues the inferior man. 
Everyone has had the experience of thinking, "if only I had a 
chance to do this over again, I'd get it right." In ressentiment one 
bitterly obsesses over the shngs and arrows of outrageous fortune, 
and all those people and injustices which have stood in one's way. 
Eternal recurrence can help one avoid ressentiment when it is 
understood within Nietzsche's theory of the necessary 
interconnection of things. According to Nehamas, Nietzsche: 
believes that the world and everything in it are such that if 
anything in the world ever occurred again (though this is in fact 
impossible) then everything else would also have to occur again. 
This is so because Nietzsche accepts the view that the 
connections that constitute eveiything in the world, and in 
particular the connections that constitute each person out of its 
experiences and actions are absolutely essential to that person." 
In other words, you are your past. I am what I am today because 
of everything that happened yesterday, not only in my paltry life, 
but everywhere in the world. If anything had been different then, 
then I would be different now. Eternal recurrence is, in other 
words, a denial of the premise of the movie Groundhog Day in 
which Bill Murray's character is cursed, and eventually blessed, to 
hve the same day over and over again (with, however, the memory 
of all previous relivings) until he gets it "right." In this reading, 
Nietzsche's point is not just that one should live one's life in a 
certain way because one will, in fact, live it over and over again." 
Rather, it is that one should look forward because one could not 
® DANTO, supra note 11, at 212. 
^ NEHAMAS, supra note 18, at 6-7. 
^ "But he also accepts the stronger view that if any object in the world were at all 
different, then every object in the world would also be different." Id. at 155. 
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change the past even if one could relive one's life. 
[The theory of eternal recurrence] holds that a life is justified 
only if one would want to have again the same life one had 
already had, since, as the will to power shows, no other life can 
ever be possible. The eternal recurrence therefore holds that 
our life is justified only if we fashion it in such a way that we 
would want it to be exactly as it had been already.*"^ 
The idea of eternal recurrence is to experience one moment 
of satisfaction in which the subject can say "yes!" to life—^to not be 
castrated. Because this moment will return eternally, this is 
equivalent to saying that his castration shall always be cured— 
even if he is missing it now, the phallus shall always return to him 
in the future over and over and over again. Indeed, eternal 
recurrence is, in effect, an attempt to collapse the future 
performance of the executory contract of exchange back into a 
present possessory claim of property. Eternity is equivalent to the 
collapse of all time into a single moment. In Alphonso Lingis's 
words, eternal recurrence is "an infinity in the present moment, an 
eternity in intensity—^the 'deep, deep eternity.'"®' Consequently, 
one's life does have a teleology—to return to the same place. 
As I already suggested, Nietzsche replaces Kant's standard of 
universality with eternity. Universality is possession, and eternity 
is exchange. In a theory based on the former, the masculine 
subject tells himself that the phallus is always here. In a theory 
based on the latter, he tells himself that the phallus will always 
return. 
Debra Bergoffen tries to defend Nietzsche's theory of eternal 
recurrence as an attempt to short-circuit Lacan s vicious circle of 
desire: 
Nietzsche recognizes the insistent and insatiable nature of the 
desire for the absolute as he argues against the reinstitution of 
the repression of subjectivity. Recognizing that the dialectic of 
desire cannot be given up, and insisting that the recognition of 
existential singularity should not be given up, Nietzsche uses the 
value of the recognition of subjectivity to displace the meaning 
of the desire for the absolute. Ultimately, he will propose the 
eternal recurrence as the object of this desire.... He asks us to 
^ Id at 7. 
67 Alphonso Lingis, The Will to Power, in THE NEW NIETZSCHE; CONTEMPORARY 
STYLES OF INTERPRETATION 37,60 (David B. Allison ed., 1985). In Ldwith's words: 
[Tlhe motif of "overcoming," not only of one's own time and of oneself, but of 
the temporality of time altogether, towmd the eternity of the eternal recurrence 
of the same. "The true eternity is not the one that excludes all time, but the one 
that itself holds time (eternal time) in submission. True eternity is the 
overcoming of time." 
LowiTH, supra note 20, at 186. 
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recognize the need to renounce God as the object of our desire 
for the absolute. Ultimately, he will demand that we transform 
our desire for the one into a desire for oneness, that we 
transform the desire for the singular to the desire for 
singularity.® 
That is, in Bergoffen's view, Nietzsche understands the futility of 
desire conceived as the impetus for an impossible divine 
wholeness, and seeks to reinterpret it as an obtainable human 
oneness. She suggests; "The desire for the absolute must speak the 
desire of desire rather than the desire of fulfillment. It must value 
the lack and the movement of overcoming the lack rather than the 
lack overcome."® But this supposed resolution of the problem of 
desire is merely the masculine denial of the problem. Desire is still 
understood as the resolution of the constituent split of subjectivity, 
the healing of the scar of castration, and the achievement of 
integrity. From a Lacanian perspective, the desire for the One is 
the same as the desire for oneness. Bergoffen's Nietzsche, like the 
masculine subject engaged in the fantasy of exchange, admits that 
he does not have, and cannot have, the original phallus understood 
as merger with the divine, but only because he fantasizes that he 
will soon obtain the phallus of personal integrity. That is, the 
phallus of eternity replaces the phallus of universality. In Lowith s 
words; "Such a simplified world is the ring... of the eternal 
recurrence. The 'fragment' 'man' completes himself in the whole 
of this world-historical ring by means of a will that wills to get out 
to what else can be by willing back to what already was."™ 
In proposing this interpretation of Nietzsche, Bergoffen, like 
the masculine subject, forgets her initial correct analysis that the 
Lacanian-Nietzschean subject is nothing but the split or desire. If 
so, one cannot, as Bergoffen suggests, resolve the paradox of 
desire (by substituting oneness for the One as the object of desire) 
while still remaining a subject. Indeed, the resolution of desire is 
precisely the suppression of subjectivity that Bergoffen believes 
Nietzsche is trying to avoid. For the subject to remain a subject he 
must sustain, not resolve, desire. If this is a correct interpretation 
of the theory of eternal recurrence, it is necessarily a failed 
concept. . . ^ f 
Consequently, I will offer a more interesting interpretation of 
eternal recurrence from a Lacanian standpoint. Perhaps it is not a 
failed masculine attempt to resolve desire while sustaining 
subjectivity. Rather it is an attempt to renounce desire with the 
^ Bergoffen, supra note 49, at 62. 
® Id. at 69. 
™ LOWITH, supra note 20, at 111. 
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understanding that to do so is precisely to sacrifice one s 
subjectivity. That is, eternal recurrence looks forward to the 
rotary motion of drive. I show that this interpretatioii makes the 
concept of eternal recurrence more consistent with one of 
Nietzsche's other most important concepts—the will to power. 
3. The Fetishist Split 
Before moving on to drive, I wish to suggest that Nehamas 
defense of eternal recurrence is a sophisticated version of the 
masculine denial of castration. He would no doubt argue that my 
foregoing interpretation of eternal recurrence as the masculine 
subject's attempt to deny castration ignores his argument that one 
need not believe that eternal recurrence is literally true. As 
discussed, in his view, one can understand eternal recurrence as a 
mere thought experiment or a test of strength, rather than a 
cosmology. For the purpose of developing a moral theory, it is 
sufficient if eternal recurrence is a mere enigma or possibility. As 
such, eternal recurrence can operate even if we admit that it might 
not really be true (and the phallus might not really return), so long 
as we live our lives as though it were true (and it would return). 
Lacan calls this an attempt to have one's cake and eat it too the 
"fetishist split." . 
The fetishist split is one of several strategies that Zizek 
suggests one can take when one is confronted with the fact of 
castration in the sense that the big Other does not exist (the 
symbolic order is not the natural, pre-existing, closed, and 
objective system it claims to be) and there is no Other of the Other 
(there is no God, teleology, or other guiding spirit behind the 
symbolic order) Fetishism is, of course, a characteristically 
masculine psychic position. . , i 
The subject in a fetishist split at one conscious level 
recognizes castration, but in his unconscious beliefs and actions, he 
cannot accept its implications. The fetishist says, "I know that X 
isn't true, and yet, to be on the safe side, I will act as though it 
were true." Zizek gives an excellent example—the public reaction 
to the so-called "Y2K bug" in late 1999. On radio, television, and 
in the newspapers, officials and other talking heads repeatedly 
tried to assure the public that the bug would not cause major 
disruptions, but just in case one should withdraw extra cash from 
•" Jeanne L Schroeder, The Four Discourses of Law: A Lacanian Analysis of Legal 
Practice and Scholarship, 75 TEX. L. REV. 15, 74-75 (2000) [hereinafter Schroeder, Four 
Discourses]. 
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the ATM, buy extra milk and other staples, make sure the 
flashlight has batteries, etc.^^ In Nehamas', (and perhaps 
Nietzsche's) case, he says, in effect, I know that my life will not 
eternally recur, and yet in order to be safe (to know myself to be 
strong), I must live my life as though it were. 
In the fetishist split (I know, but nevertheless ...), the denied 
fact becomes the denying subject's objet petit a. If it were true, 
then it would explain one's life. It gives body to lack. 
C. Drive 
Up to now I have been speaking about desire. Now I turn to 
that which Lacan called libido, the myth of the lamella, but most 
frequently the "drive."" 
1. Driving in Circles 
Distancing himself from Freud, Lacan did not equate drive 
with either the animal mating instinct, nor with human sexuality 
which is characterized by desire. Rather, drive is a uniquely 
human, non-sexual impulse—^it may be thought of as that part of 
our primordial "real" animal instinct that is left over after its 
sexual aspect has been symbolized as desire." 
Animal instinct and desire have goals. In the former, this goal 
is always easily fulfilled by the physical act of mating (or eating, or 
whatever). Because desire is the desire for completion, desire is 
teleological: desire has both an aim (impetus) and a goal (an end, a 
cause). The goal of desire is, however, imaginary in that it 
(attaining the object of desire, jouissance, wholeness, etc.) can 
never be achieved, only pursued. In contrast, drive has no goal, it 
•^2 SLAVOJ ZI2EK DID SOMEONE SAY TOTALITARIANISM?: FIVE INTERVENTIONS IN 
THE (MIS)USE OF A NOTION 252-56 (2001) [hereinafter ZIZEK, TOTALITARIANISM). 
73 RENATA SALECL, (PER)VERSIONS OF LOVE AND HATE 48 (1999). Lacan s most 
thoroueh discussion of the drive are contained in his eleventh seminar, transited into 
English as JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHO­
ANALYSIS (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) [hereinafter LACAN, 
THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS], and in the essay The Positions of the Unconscious 
which was published in the French (but not the English) edition of Ecrits, and has been 
recently published in JACQUES LACAN, READING SEMINAR XI: LAGAN S FOUR 
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 259 (Richard Feldstem et al. eds., 1995) 
[hereinafter LACAN, READING SEMINAR XI]. ... „ FT > ^U-
7'' See SALECL, supra note 73, at 48. In Lacan's words qm]y lamella [Lacan s mythic 
personification of the drive] represents here the part of a living being that is lost when that 
being is produced through the straits of sex." LACAN, READINGS SEMINAR XI, supra 
note 73, at 274. 
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only has aimJ' It is thrust without purpose other than its own 
activity. Drive does not impel us to achieve a goal (possible in the 
case of instinct and impossible in the case of desire), but pressures 
us to continue doing what we are doing. Drive is the Nike slogan, 
"Just Do It!" 
Drive is an attempt to get beyond the impossibility of desire 
by foreswearing desire entirely. The relationship of drive to 
enjoyment is the obverse of that of desire and puissance. 
Jouissance, or enjoyment, is an extremely complex and paradoxical 
idea that I can only touch on here. The concept does not have the 
colloquial meaning of "pleasure." It often takes the form of the 
perverse pleasure we feel in pain. Indeed, it is unbearab e. or 
the very limited purposes of this paper, enjoyment can be thought 
of as the momentary ecstatic collapse of the three orders into a 
primal unity. As such, enjoyment is an obliteration of subjectivity 
that is as much to be feared as to be desired. 
Nevertheless, as the achievement of the real, enjoyment is the 
elusive object or goal of desire. It is the necessary failure of desire 
to reach its goal that is the engine of desire. Consequently, in the 
realm of desire, enjoyment is always forbidden and always 
pursued. In drive, however, the subject who gives up on desire 
also, necessarily, ceases to chase enjoyment. Paradoxically, 
however, the driven subject always achieves a certain idiotic 
enjoyment merely by endlessly engaging in the activUy x^thout 
purpose.'' In drive, one does not try to reach one's object little a, 
one just happily circles around it. Having no goal that can be 
thwarted, the subject of the drive is always satisfied or, more 
accurately, can never be unsatisfied.'® The drive results m an 
•n In Ziiek's words, "an idiotic-happy circuit ot the apparatus wnicn prou 
puissance, is this not the very definition of driveT Id. at 295; see also Quinet, supra : 
75, at 140-41. 
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obscene enjoyment through compulsive repetitive activity to its 
utter destructive limit, no matter what the consequences. It is the 
dance of death. 
Drive is the Freudian pleasure principle. Lacan, however, 
departs from Freud and rejects the opposition between the 
pleasure principle and the death drive and declares them to be one 
and the same thing: all drives are death drives.'' Drives ceaselessly 
continues to circle around the subject's painful pleasure of always 
being satisfied, because he has no goal. Consequently, the subject 
of the death drive is curiously immortal—^in the sense that the 
living dead are immortal. The subject of the drive is always 
already dead, because he is unable to live.®" Being obsessively and 
mindlessly driven, the subject of a drive loses her freedom and 
becomes a passive object. 
It is this asexual, solipsistic satisfaction that is the enjoyment 
of eternal recurrence. Nietzsche has given up on the concepts of a 
goal—a teleology—^and of the possibility of the wholeness of the 
symbohc order. God is dead. Because of this, the superior man 
gives up on Lacanian desire. Instead, he accepts the will to 
power—drive—^the mere expansion of energy for its own sake. He 
will find that which gives him pleasure and just do it. The ideal of 
eternal recurrence is that he will act as though he were to do this 
over and over again. If eternal recurrence is a hteral cosmology, 
he will in fact do this forever, like the vampire who never grows 
old. 
satisfaction: "The object that corresponds to drive is satisfaction as object." In 
this search for satisfaction, drive resembles perversion. 
SALECL, supra note 74, at 50 (quoting Jacques-Alain, Miller, On Perversion, M READING 
SEMINARS I AND II: RETURN TO FREUD 313 (1996)). See also LACAN, THE FOUR 
FUNDAMENTALS CONCEPTS, WPRA note 73, at 166-67. , 
LACAN, READINGS SEMINAR XI, supra note 74, at 275. In Lacan s rewriting of 
Freud, the death drive has nothing to do with the "desire" to die. In fact, Ziiek intim^s 
that the death drive is the immortal part of our soul—its universality. ZIZEK, THE 
TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 76, at 292-94. The death drive is the same as the pleasure 
principal. The death drive as compulsion is the very inability to die, or to realize 
Thanatos, the desire for death as release. . j- , j 
The death drive is the "satisfaction in aberration, and even m aberrant acts directed 
against yourself, that is, finding satisfaction in aggression for the sake of aggression. 
Jacques-Alain Miller, A Discussion of Lacan's "Kant With Sade", in READING SEMINARS 
I AND II: LAGAN'S RETURN TO FREUD 212,220 (Richard Feldstem et al. eds., 19%). 
80 "ITlhe 'death drive' designates the dimension of what horror fiction calls the 
'undead,' a strange, immortal, indestructible life that persists beyond death." ZIZEK, THE 
TICKLISH SUBJECT, supra note 76, at 294. Caught in this unending circle of perverse 
satisfaction and pressure, the subject of drive—like the legendary vampire of &ction— 
leams to escape into true death. Lacan introduces this uncanny aspect of the death dnve 
in his famously bizarre myth of the lamella—the monstrous, immortal living dead, asexu^ 
twin bom with each human subject. See LACAN, READINGS SEMINAR XI, supra note 73, 
at 273-76. 
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2. Subjective Destitution and the Will to Power 
As described, drive sounds horrific—^and it often is. This is 
why Nietzsche correctly insists that one's initial reaction to eternal 
recurrence is likely to be gut-wrenching nausea. Drive is, however, 
also the only type of cure that Lacanian psychoanalysis can offer." 
The most that psychoanalysis can do for the suffering analysand is 
to help her give up on her impossible desire that brings only pain. 
Drive is the only alternative. Lacan calls this cure "subjective 
destitution." 
In Zizek' words: 
"[Sjubjective destitution" changes the register from desire to 
drive. Desire is historical and subjectivized, always and by 
definition unsatisfied, metonymical, shifting from one object to 
another since I do not actually desire what I want. What I 
actually desire is to sustain desire itself, to postpone the 
dreaded moment of its satisfaction. Drive, on the other hand, 
involves a kind of inert satisfaction that always finds its way; 
drive is nonsubjectivized ("acephalous").^^ 
Having given up on desire, the driven subject has no need for 
an objet petit a as the eause of his desire. "TTie subject becomes 
'eause of myself in the sense of no longer looking for a guarantee 
of his or her existence in another's desire."®*^ My phrase, "driven 
subject" is, therefore, a misnomer. The driven person is non-
subjectified. When she aets, it is not beeause she desires to do so. 
Rather, "it wants it." In other words, if the subject is nothing but 
the capacity for desire, and if cure is the replaeement of desire by 
drive, then to be cured is to lose one's subjectivity. In drive, the 
"subjeet" achieves an idiotic enjoyment, but enjoyment is precisely 
the obliteration of subjeetivity. This is why Zizek describes the 
driven person as the living dead—^he continues to act but he is no 
longer a subject. 
Drive as the de-subjectification of desire and objectification of 
the person can also be seen in Nietzsche's concept of will to 
power—^which is now revealed to be inextricably hnked to eternal 
reeurrence. Nietzsehe's misleading terminology might suggest that 
he is referring to a conscious act by which a subject seeks to 
Perhaps this is why "Lacan said that psychoanalysis did not have as its goal curing 
patients, and that if people in analysis did get better it was a welcome side effect." 
STUART SCHNEIDERMAN, JACQUES LAGAN: THE DEATH OF AN INTELLECTUAL HERO 
50 (1983). 
82 ZIZEK, ABYSS, supra note 55, at 80. 
83 Id. 
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impose his will on the world or others (a form of desire). This is 
incorrect. There is no subject of the will to power.^" Rather, the 
subject, like everything in the world, inanimate and animate, is 
subject to the will to power. Life itself is nothing but the will to 
power.®^ To Nietzsche, "there is no such thing as a will"®® in the 
sense of a subjective, intentional state of mind. "[T]he will as a 
conscious faculty is neither a unity nor a primary term."®^ Indeed, 
'"[wjilling' is not 'desiring,' striving, demanding: it is distinguished 
from these by the affect of commanding It is part of willing 
that something is commanded That state of tension by virtue 
of which a force seeks to discharge itself—^is not an example of 
'willing.'"®® 
"To will is to feel the triumph of a force that has cleared a way 
for itself quite apart from our knowing anything about it[.]"®» "The 
will that is Will to Power responds at its origins to its own internal 
imperative: to be more."^ The will to power is circular, or in 
Nietzsche's terminology, "chaotic," in that it does not aim towards 
any goal other than the eternal repetition of itself—chaos is "the 
moment when, all values collapsed, the Will to Power effects a 
return to itself, a sort of return to point zero."" 
As in drive, the subject of the will to power does not act. 
Rather, "it" (the will) acts through the subject. In Deleuze's words 
"The Will to Power alone is what wills; it is neither relegated nor 
removed to another subject, even by force.""^ 
Although Nietzsche says that life is nothing but the will to 
power, one should not assume from this that the will to power is 
the desire for self-preservation. Indeed, if the will to power were, 
it would have a goal and be teleological—a form of desire. Rather, 
®^ "[A]ny interpretation of the Will to Power that is solely psychological or 
anthropological" is a "gross misconception." Haar, supra note 19, at 8. "The Will to 
Power is something much different from the psychological relationship between a subject 
qua will and an object qua power." Id. 
"But what is life? Here we need a new, more definite formulation of the concept 
"life." My formula for it is: Life is will to power." NIETZSCHE, WILL TO POWER, supra 
note 6, at 148. 
®® Haar, supra note 19, at 9 (citing NIETZSCHE, WILL TO POWER para. 46). 
87 Id. 
88 NIETZSCHE, WILL TO POWER, supra note 6, at 353. 
®' Haar, supra note 19, at 10. 
90 Id. at 11. 
91 Id. 
92 Deleuze, supra note 30, at 87. See also Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche's Experience of 
the Eternal Return, in THE NEW NIETZSCHE: CONTEMPORARY STYLES OF 
INTERPRETATION 107, 117 (David B. AlUson ed., 1985). "The Will to Power is only a 
humanized term for the soul of the vicious circle, while the circle itself is pure intensity 
without intention" Id. "The feeling of eternity and the extemalization of desire are 
merged in a single moment " Id. at 119. 
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the will to power is the assertion of its circular, whirling, chaotic 
force regardless of the effect on the subject. Consequently, when 
the will to power takes the form of a searching for truth or 
identity, then it becomes a nihilistic will to power, "or, more 
bluntly,... a covert will to die, a covert death-wish. 
In Ldwith's words, "Zarathustra's real word is the freedom 
toward death, which freedom is at one with the will to the eternal 
recurrence. But the recurrence is not proclaimable until after the 
temptation to destroy oneself has already been overcome.'"" 
Consequently, "The Will to Power is an abyss... the 
groundless chaos beneath all the grounds, all the foundations, and 
it leaves the whole order of essences groundless.The will to 
power that governs the world as well as ourselves is the very 
concept of the lack of teleology that underlies the concept of 
eternal recurrence. It is drive as the denial of the goal that 
constitutes desire."^ 
In fact, at the moment when I am struck by the sudden 
revelation of the Eternal Return, I no longer am. In order for 
this revelation to have any meaning, it is necessary that I lose 
consciousness of myself, and that the circular movement of the 
return be merged with my unconsciousness until such time as it 
leads me back to the point where the necessity of living through 
the entire series of my possibilities is revealed to me."" 
Drive, like eternal recurrence, is ultimately "a closed" 
system.'^ is sl subject of desire and object of drive. In 
desire, the subject longs for the (lost) object, whereas in drive, the 
subject makes herself an object'"" subjected to the will to power. 
This is why Nietzsche says that the superman must overcome his 
humanity. 
One criticism of Nietzsche's theory of eternal recurrence is 
that it is inconsistent with notions of freedom and subjectivity 
found elsewhere in his work and in the very concept of will. 
Indeed, Lowith ultimately considers eternal recurrence to be a 
noble failure for this reason."" But this apparent contradiction 
Haar, supra note 19, at 18. 
LOWITH, supra note 20, at 67. 
Lingis, supra note 67, at 38. 
^ "Nietzsche argues that if the world had a goal, it must have been reached The 
ideal order of metaphysical essences exists by eternal recurrence." Id. at 43. 
Klossowski, supra note 92, at 109. 
ZizEK, ABYSS, supra note 55, at 84. 
Id. at 85. 
'O" For example, Lowith states: 
But the fact that the mere idea of a possibility can "have an influence" does 
not abolish the distinction between an actual recurrence... and a recurrence 
that is only thought as a possibility. And if, on the other hand, it were certain 
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disappears when one interprets eternal recurrence as drive and 
recognizes that the will to power is not subjective. Eternal 
recurrence as subjective destitution—the objectification of the 
subject—^requires an impersonal will. Human nature must be 
overcome. The eternal recurrence of the same is predestination— 
the freedom from freedom. Consequently, Nietzsche declares that 
"[t]he highest state a philosopher can attain... is amor fati[,Y^°^ 
love of fate. 
This necessarily follows from Nietzsche's insistence on the 
death of God. It is a common misunderstanding to suppose that: 
God doesn't exist,... then everything is permitted. Quite 
evidently, a naive notion, for we analysts know full well that if God 
doesn't exist, then nothing at all is permitted any longer. 
Neurotics prove that to us every day."^°^ 
The impossible position of subjectivity and desire are the 
preconditions of freedom.^^^ The will to power is nothing but the 
freedom freedom. 
3. Cure 
Nietzsche was, of course, fighting a losing battle with 
psychosis. The psychotic is the subject that truly sees that the big 
Other does not exist. The cynic who thinks that he sees through 
the fraud of the social and, therefore, that it does not function, is in 
fact the person most subject to the symbolic order because he is 
unaware of how it constrains him. The fetishist knows that the big 
Other does not exist, but nevertheless acts as though it does, 
thereby making it function. The most healthy individual sees that 
the big Other does not exist, but understands that nevertheless we 
can make it function. For the psychotic, however, the big Other 
that at all events everything recurs, then the demand "to live as if would lose all 
reasonable meaning. 
LOWITH, supra note 20, at 88. He continues: 
For if human life is turned upside down again and again like an hourglass, and if 
human existence including human ideas is only one ring in the great ring of the 
eternal recurrence of all that is—what sense would it then still make to want to 
get above oneself, to will a European future, to "will" anything at all? This 
contradiction emerges all the more strikingly inasmuch as Nietzsche develops 
the one meaning as an ethical imperative and the other as a scientific theorv. 
Id. 
101 NIETZSCHE, WILL TO POWER, supra note 6, at 536. 
™ JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN: BOOK II: THE EGO IN 
FREUD'S THEORY AND IN THE TECHNIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 1954-55, at 128 
(Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Sylvana Tomaselli trans., 1988) (quoting words that 
Dostoyevsky placed in the mouth of the father in The Brothers Karamazov) [hereinafter 
LACAN, SEMINAR II]. 
See Schroeder, The Stumbling Block, supra note 32. 
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literally disintegrates before his eyes. He cannot maintain his 
castration—the distinction between the real, imaginary, and 
symbolic that makes consciousness possible. He rants as the 
symbolic world of words loses meaning for him and he hallucinates 
as the real world starts speaking to hina. Armchair psychoanalysis 
of a historical figure is a notoriously foolish enterpnse. 
Nevertheless, was Nietzsche's theory of eternal recurrence an 
attempted home remedy for psychosis? 
III. CAN LAWYERS BE CURED? 
Does the doctrine of eternal recurrence have anything to add 
to the practice or study of law? Lawyers are a notoriously 
cantankerous lot. We do not merely carry grudges, a substantial 
part of our practice consists precisely in carrying other peoples 
grudges. Moreover, studies show that lawyers, as a group, are 
unusually unhappy. In stark contrast to successful students m 
every other discipline, depressive law students actually outperform 
their happier colleagues. Could lawyers overcome their 
resentment and unhappiness by adopting the positive view of life 
caused by the acceptance of the eternal return? Could they submit 
to the idiotic enjoyment of drive? Can lawyers be cured? 
No, they cannot and still practice as attorneys. 
A. Discourse 
I have argued extensively elsewhere that the legal profession 
can be analyzed within Lacanian discourse theory."^ Lac^ 
proposed that there were four discourses: that of the master, the 
university, the analyst, and the hysteric. Each discourse can be 
represented by the following diagram: 
agent —^ other 
truth product/loss^"^ 
On the upper level, an agent, the person, or institution 
"speaking" in the discourse,'"® addresses someone or somethmg 
else as its other.'"^ This relationship is represented by the arrow 
10^ See Schroeder, Four Discourses, supra note 71. 
105 RNK, supra note 43, at 131. 
106 Id. at 130-31. 
107 
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proceeding from the agent to the other.^'^ Beneath the other lies 
that which is produced by the discoursed® This can be something 
created or something lost. Beneath the agent lies the hidden truth 
of the agentThe positions in upper register (the agent and the 
other) are separated by a bar from their correspondents m the 
lower register (the truth and the product, respectively), 
representing the fact that the upper level is somehow split, 
separated, Sr barred from the lower.- There is also no arrow 
connecting the two sides of the lower register, representing the tact 
that there is no direct, immediate relationship at this level. 
There are four concepts that rotate around the four positions 
in the matrix of discourse: S, S„ a, and Lacamans will 
recognize that these stand for the Master Sigmfier, the signif^g 
chain (or knowledge), the objet petit a, and the split subject 
respectively. These concepts take on slightly different meanings 
depending on where they are placed in the matrix."^ In this paper, 
I will only discuss certain aspects of these concepts in connection 
with their position in the hysteric's discourse. 
On the right, the side of the receiver, the top position is designated as that of the 
other, which is occupied by the factor called into action by the dominant factor 
in the message. The activation of this factor is a prerequisite for receiving and 
understanding a given message or discourse. For example, ^ematic 
knowledge is the dominant element of a discourse (occupying the top left 
position), receivers, in order really to receive (i.e., understmd) 
must (for a moment, at least) be receptive to a preconstituted knowledge, which 
means emptying themselves of any knowledge that might interfere with the 
knowledge in the discourse and becoming an amorphous, nonarticulated 
substance, a, to be articulated by the discourse. ^ 
Mark Bracher On the Psychological and Social Functions o/Language: Ucan s Theory of 
the Four Discourses, in LACANIAN THEORY OF DISCOURSE; SUBJECT, STRUCTURE, AND 
SOCIETY 107,109 (Mark Bracher et al. eds., 1994). 
™ FINK, supra note 43, at 131. .. mo 
"What is produced as a result of [those who are placed in the position of the othep 
allowing themselves to be thus interpellated by the dominant factor of a discourse is 
represented by the position of production, the bottom nght." Bracher, supra note 107, 
109. 
no 
The top position on each side represents the overt or manifest factor, the bottom 
position the covert, latent, implicit, or repressed factor^he factor that acts or 
occurs beneath the surface. More specifically, the top left position is the place of 
agency or dominance; it is occupied by the factor m a ^tsco^e that ^ 
active and obvious. The bottom left position is the place of (hidden truth, the 
factor that underlies, supports, and gives use to the dominant factor, or 
constitutes the condition of its possibility, but is repressed by it. 
^^111 This "bar" between the two registers is, in fact, the same "bar" that bifurcates the 
matheme of the split subject (S) and, therefore, represents a fundamental rupture. 
n3 of the meanings of these ideas when the four discoumes 
are applied to legal scholarship and practice in Schroeder, Four Discourses, supra note 7 . 
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The discourse of the master is law understood from the 
position of the law giver. It is the positivist view of law associated 
with H.L.A. Hart."" The discourse of the university is law 
understood from the position of expertise. It is law as engaged in 
by the expert who interprets and applies the law to manipulate the 
actions of others in order to achieve a policy goal."^ The first two 
discourses are the discourses of power engaged in by the state and 
its courts, and that large part of legal academia that views its role 
as giving advice to the state. They approach the law from the 
position of the governor."® 
It is the last two discourses that properly apply to the 
practicing attorney. These two discourses approach law from the 
position of the governed—^the subject subjected to the law."^ The 
discourse of the analyst is the understanding of law from the 
position of the harm caused, or potentially to be remedied by the 
law. It is engaged in by the attorney when she advises and 
counsels her client."^ The attorney engages in the discourse of the 
hysteric when she represents her client."' 
B. Hysteria 
Because the vast majority of legal practice takes place within 
the hysteric's discourse, I will limit my remarks to it. As already 
introduced, hysteria is the characteristic position of subjectivity. 
The hysteric's subjectivity is created and exists through her desire. 
Sometimes this is expressed in the slogan, "the desire of man is the 
desire of the Other.""® The ambiguity of the expression is 
intentional: the subject desires the Other, she desires that the 
Other desire her, and her desire is imposed upon her by the 
Other."^ 
Up until now I have used the term "Other" only in passing. 
Lacan's term "Other" spelled with a capital "O" can designate, but 
exceeds, specific other individuals desired by the subject. More 
11" Id. at 46-53. 
115 Id. at 53-56,59-63. 
116 Id. at 39-41. 
1" Id. 
118 Id. at 68-72. 
119 Id. at 85-89. 
120 "Jo j{ jjj 3 nutshell, nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire finds 
its meaning in the desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the key to the 
object desired, as because the first object of desire is to be recognized by the other." 
Anthony Wilden, Translators Notes, in JACQUES LACAN, SPEECH AND LANGUAGE IN 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 91 (Anthony Wilden trans., 1981). 
121 See Schroeder, Four Discourses, supra note 72, at 74. 
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broadly, it includes alterity understood as the symbolic order 
itself—^the social order of language, sexuality, and law3^^ As the 
hysteric exists only with respect to her relationship to and with the 
symbolic order, she constantly seeks to understand how she fits 
into the symbolic. Consequently, the hysteric question is ''Che 
voui?" What do you want (i.e., from me)?^^^ How can I make you 
desire (recognize) me? What must I do to be a law abiding part of 
the symbolic order. 
By asking "What do you want?" the hysteric can eventually 
have an epiphany with respect to the Other. The symbolic order 
wants, and, therefore, is wanting.^^"* The symbolic order—^including 
law—is not objective, necessary, permanent, and complete as it 
pretends to be. Rather it is subjective, contingent, temporary, and 
open. As I have said,'^^ it is the meaning of Lacan's famous slogan 
that "the big Other does not exist." To say that it does not "exist," 
however, does not mean that it does not function. The hysteric's 
position is feminine in the sense that the realization that the 
symbolic order, like the subject, is not complete is the acceptance 
of castration. 
C. The Hysteric Discourse 
Why is the practicing attorney engaged in the hysteric's 
discourse? In the hysteric's discourse, the agent—^in this case the 
attorney—puts herself in the position of the split subject (S)—^the 
subject who has been subjected to, and castrated by, the symbolic 
order.^^® Of course, in the case of the attorney, the specific split 
subject she speaks for is the client.^^^ The hysteric's discourse can 
be diagrammed as follows: 
See id. at 74-75. 
Id. at 83. As explained by ZIZEK: 
One should always bear in mind that the status of the subject as such is 
hysterical: the subject "is" only through its confrontation with the enigma of 
"Che voui? ("What do you want?") insofar as the Other's desire remains 
impenetrable, insofar as the subject doesn't know what object it is for the Other. 
ZI2EK, ABYSS, supra note 55, at 79 (citation omitted). Lacan posited that the subject 
addresses the Big Other with the question "Che voui?" at least as early as his 1960 paper 
Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious. JAQUES 
LAGAN, The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian 
Unconscious, in LAGAN, EGRITS, A SELECTION 312 (Alan Sheridan trans, 1977). 
See Schroeder, Four Discourses, supra note 71, at 82-83. 
See supra text at notes 50-52. 
126 "In the hysterical link, the S over a stands for the subject who is divided, 
traumatized, by what an object she is for the Other, what role she plays in Other's 
desire...." Slavoj Zizek, Four Discourses, Four Subjects, in SiG 2: COGITO AND THE 
UNGONSGIOUS 79 (Slavoj Zi2ek ed., 1998) [hereinafter Zizek, Four Discourses]. 
122 Schroeder, Four Discourses, supra note 71, at 83-84. 
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S —^ Sj 
a 
In the hysteric discourse the agent addresses the Master 
Signifier as her other: S -» Sj. The Master Signifier is that which is 
supposed to give meaning to the symbolic order represented by all 
of the other signifiers (S^). "[Q]uite common master signifiers 
would include words like 'God,' 'Satan,' 'sin,' 'heaven,' and 'hell' 
in religious discourse and terms such as 'American,' 'freedom,' 
'democracy,' and 'communism' in political discourse.In the 
hysteric discourse the split subject addresses the Big Other's 
pretension of being pre-existing, objective, and necessary. That is, 
she asks ''Che Voui?" In this case, when the Big Other of the 
symbolic takes the specific form of law, the Master Signifier can be 
the law's claim to legitimacy."" Specifically, the lawyer 
representing her client addresses the individual or institutions that 
are at that time claiming the status of the law. This is most obvious 
when the attorney petitions or sues the state on the client's behalf. 
But it is equally true when she brings a civil action against another 
person in that, by doing so, she is challenging the status quo."' 
Less obviously, it is also true when the attorney negotiates 
contracts on behalf of the client."^ 
The agent addresses the big Other with the hysteric's question 
"Che Voui?" When one negotiates a contract, or seeks to comply 
with the law (by, for example, applying for a license), this question 
is asked in an inquisitive, but not accusatory, voice: "What do you 
want from me?" in the sense of "What do I need to do to comply" 
or "What do you want from me in exchange for what I want from 
you?" In htigation, however, the question takes on its more 
aggressive form of the accusation of castration. The status quo is 
wanting and, therefore, should be changed. 
The product of this discourse, located at the lower right 
comer, is —^the signifying chain which in this case stands for 
"knowledge."'" The hysteric can leam several things through this 
128 Id. at 83; FINK, supra note 43, at 133. 
129 Bracher, supra note 107, at 112. 
120 In Bracher's formulation: "It is this quest to which the receiver of the hysterical 
subject's message is summoned to respond by providing a master signifier, Sj, in the form 
of a secure meaning that will overcome anxiety, meaninglessness, and shame and give a 
sense of stable, meaningful, respectable identity." Bracher, supra note 107, at 123. See 
Schroeder, Four Discourses, supra note 71, at 84. 
121 Schroeder, Four Discourses, supra note 71, at 89. 
132 Id. at 86-89. 
133 "What leads to knowledge is—I will be allowed to justify this in the more or less 
long term—the hysteric's discourse." LAGAN, SEMINAR XVII, supra note 46, at 23; 
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discourse. First, in a limited sense, the split subject can learn what 
the Other wants from her—^what she needs to do or say in order to 
fit better into the symbolic order. Of course, it is a fundamental 
Lacanian point that a perfect fit will never be possible—every 
normal subject remains spht and castrated to some extent. 
Consequently, more critically, she can learn what is lacking in the 
symbolic order. She can learn what its flaws are in order to decide 
whether to accept them or seek to change them. This can lead to 
the final stage of knowledge—^the knowledge that the Big Other 
does not exist. The reason the Big Other can never truly answer 
the hysteric's question "What do you want?" is explained by its 
alternate version as the accusation "You are wanting!" The Big 
Other—the symbolic order—is not a pre-existing "thing," it is our 
own human creation."" 
This means that only the subject herself can answer the 
question as to what she needs to do to satisfy her own desire and 
how to change the Big Other better to accomplish this. The 
knowledge obtained is precisely that the Big Other cannot 
accommodate, and does not have the truth of, the subject's desire. 
It is the hysteric's discourse that allows this indirect relationship to 
come about. 
This can lead to two results. The first is depression and 
impotence. Why should the hysteric try when the task of 
completing the Other is doomed to failure? How can the hysteric 
face the fact that she is partially responsible for the imperfection 
(and resulting violence and injustice) of the social order when she 
cannot cure it? 
Alternately, however, this knowledge can give the hysteric the 
courage to go on. Once one rejects the impossible goal of making 
the Other perfect, the hysteric's profession of building the Other 
becomes possible. The fact that the Other is not natural or 
complete means that it is a work of art in progress. The hysteric 
can express her creative freedom by furthering its progress. The 
hysteric can harbor the hope that she can at least partially expiate 
her guilt for participating in the injustice of the status quo by 
trying to undo this injustice. She cannot make things perfect, but 
perhaps she can make things better."' 
In the specific context of law, the result that is produced is 
knowledge in the sense of a greater understanding of the 
relationship between the law and the subject. This knowledge will 
frequently be subjective and personal. The subject, by winning or 
Schroeder, Four Discourses, supra note 71, at 84-85. 
Schroeder, Four Discourses, supra note 71, at 84-85. 
135 Id. at 95. 
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losing her case, by successfully or unsuccessfully engaging in a 
transaction, knows or changes her relationship to the law. 
Sometimes the understanding is inter subjective in that the 
doctrinal or speculative scholar might throw new light on a legal 
problem that enlightens not only the scholar herself but other 
practitioners or scholars. Sometimes, if the doctrinal or 
speculative scholarship leads to a conclusion that the laws effect on 
the subjects subjected to the law is unjust or even unintended, this 
results in a call to change the law. Sometimes this new 
understanding actually results in a change in the law—as when 
htigation invalidates a law or leads to a new interpretation of the 
law. 
D. No Rest For the Weary 
This suggests that legal practice understood as a hysteric 
discourse may have a more or less happy ending for the client, if 
not quite a cure. But what of the attorney? 
As graphically illustrated by the discourse matrix, hidden 
beneath the agent of each discourse is the truth of that agent. In 
legal practice, the attorney is the agent who stands in the position 
of the split suffering subject-client. Her truth, however, is the objet 
petit a—^the object cause of desire itself.'^® 
Why is this so? An attorney's job is precisely to help her 
client solve his problem. The truth of the lawyer's speech is her 
client's pain. The practicing attorney, speaking from the position 
of the split subject, is nothing but the embodiment of the client's 
desire and, therefore, the very personification of her client's 
ressentiment. The practice of law is always, by definition, goal 
oriented. Consequently, the attorney can not foreswear desire in 
favor of drive and still perform her duties as an attorney. For an 
attorney to seek a cure would be to commit malpractice. 
Consequently, a Nietzschean ethic based on the idea of the eternal 
recurrence is inappropriate for the lawyer. The ethic of the 
attorney is the ethic of psychoanalysis: do not give ground relative 
to your desire.'" Drive is, alas, nothing but the giving of ground. 
Of course that does not mean that a lot of lawyers—persons 
schooled in the law—do not give up on desire and give in to drive 
as an empirical matter. The lucky ones achieve idiotic enjoyment 
by circling endlessly in repetitive activity for the pure sake of the 
136 Id. at 84. . r u 
137 "I propose then that, from an analytical point of view, the only thing of which one 
can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one's desire." LACAN, SEMINAR VII, 
supra note 61, at 319. 
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activity itself, with no hope of achieving a goal in the real world. 
This activity is called "legal scholarship," and the cured attorney a 
"law professor." Which probably explains why we are here 
today—^and shall always return—studying Nietzsche. 
